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I   INTRODUCTION 
The Cold War was replete with incidents of support by both the United States 
(‘US’) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (‘USSR’) for both governmental 
and opposition forces in other states. Interventions made to prop up a particular 
governmental regime on ideological or political grounds were very often legally 
justified on the basis of an invitation to intervene by the government concerned, a 
justification which in and of itself causes little controversy from the perspective 
of international law.1 Instead, the controversy caused by these interventions was a 
result not of the use of this as a legal justification per se, but instead the 
circumstances in which it was invoked. A cursory examination of the USSR’s 
intervention in Hungary in 1956 and that of the US in Grenada in 1983 provide 
striking examples of the Cold War superpower rivals employing this as a 
justification for intervention in somewhat disingenuous circumstances.2 
However, it became clear that during this period of ideological conflict 
support was also being provided to opposition forces in their effort to topple a 
particular regime. Yet these interventions were very often conducted by the US 
                                                 
∗  Senior Lecturer in Law and Director of the Human Rights and International Law Unit, Liverpool Law 
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1  This is due to the absence of any perceived violation of the sovereignty of the state concerned. See below 
Part II(A). See also Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of 
the Government’ (1985) 56 British Yearbook of International Law 189. 
2  The intervention in Hungary to prevent a move away from one-party rule was justified by the USSR as a 
response both to a request from a former Prime Minister and to the existence and actions of a reactionary 
underground movement. In the case of the intervention in Grenada the invitation to the US to intervene 
supposedly came from the Governor-General, a post without executive powers to make such a request. 
The US ultimately overthrew the old government and installed a new one. The United Nations General 
Assembly (‘UNGA’) condemned both interventions while the United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) 
condemnation was only avoided by the use of the veto by the respective superpower. See ‘The Hungarian 
Question’ [1956] Yearbook of the United Nations 67 and ‘Grenada Situation’ [1983] Yearbook of the 
United Nations 211 respectively. For the underlying doctrines, albeit not of a legal nature, used in support 
of these interventions, see W Michael Reisman, ‘Old Wine in New Bottles: The Regan and Brezhnev 
Doctrines in Contemporary International Law and Practice’ (1988) 13 Yale Journal of International Law 
171. 
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and the USSR using indirect proxy means. Indeed, states in general very rarely 
directly intervened in support of such opposition forces using their own armed 
forces.3 Instead, support of an indirect nature was more commonly provided, 
which included not only the provision of political and financial aid but also 
training, equipment and arms.4 However, although such support was provided 
during this era to both opposition and governmental forces, the support provided 
to opposition forces was mostly provided covertly, arguably in implicit 
recognition of the illegality of providing support to such groups and their aims.5 
For example, the US indirectly and covertly intervened in Laos between 1958–60 
in support of opposition forces in an attempt to remove a regime which it viewed 
as ideologically unsound.6 When a government came to power in 1961 which 
was seen as more ideologically favourable, it then openly bombed the then 
opposition forces.7 US support, and in particular the Central Intelligence Agency 
(‘CIA’), for the Contra forces in Nicaragua in the early 1980s provides another 
example, which the US subsequently legally justified on the basis of collective 
self-defence as opposed to an independent right to provide such support.8 
More recently, the euphemistically termed ‘Arab Spring’ has brought to the 
fore the issue of the provision of both arms and what has come to be known as 
‘non-lethal’ assistance to both government and opposition forces,9 and has also 
witnessed more open support for the forces of opposition groups. Given the 
speed and unity with which the United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) 
initially acted in Libya in 2011, the central question in that conflict concerned 
whether the provision of arms and such assistance could plausibly come within 
the mandate of the UNSC to use ‘all necessary means’ in the context of 
protecting civilians.10 In the absence of such an authorising resolution in 
connection with the conflict in Syria, however, the question of whether the 
provision of arms and non-lethal assistance is lawful is one that falls to be 
answered more directly under the principle of non-intervention and the 
prohibition of the use of force.11 
                                                 
3  Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2008) 105. 
4  Ibid 105–7. 
5  For more on the illegality of such assistance, see below Part II. 
6  A Mark Weisburd, Use of Force: The Practice of States since World War II (Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1997) 179–82; Gray, above n 3. 
7  Weisburd, above n 6, 181; Gray, above n 3. 
8  See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (‘Nicaragua’). 
9  However, assistance to opposition forces was occasionally termed ‘non-lethal’ or ‘humanitarian’ by the 
superpowers during the Cold War: see, eg, Keesing’s Worldwide, ‘Jun 1986 – PRK Proposals for Talks – 
CGDK Counter-proposals’ [1986] Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 34426; Keesing’s Worldwide, ‘Jun 
1987 – Government Changes Foreign Relations Developments in Guerrilla War Elections’ [1987] 
Keesing’s Record of World Events 35174. For more on the meaning of ‘non-lethal’ assistance, see below 
Parts II–III. 
10  See below Parts III(A), IV(A). See also Christian Henderson, ‘International Measures for the Protection 
of Civilians in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 767, 
769–72. 
11  See below Parts III(B), IV(B)–(F). 
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While issues connected with the Arab Spring have been enthusiastically 
examined in the international legal literature,12 this article seeks to address the 
specific question of the lawfulness of providing arms and ‘non-lethal’ assistance 
to both governmental and opposition forces within and outside the context of a 
civil war. This is an issue that has not been fully addressed in the legal literature, 
either in connection with the recent events of the Arab Spring or those of a more 
historical nature. Yet, the continuance of the Arab Spring provides a suitable 
backdrop for an exploration and assessment of the legality of such measures. 
Furthermore, the outcome of this assessment will offer some reflection upon the 
contemporary contours of the fundamental international legal principles of non-
intervention and non-use of force. Given this overarching aim the article is 
structured in the following manner. 
Part II sets out and examines the principle of non-intervention and the 
prohibition of the use of force and how these apply to the specific issue addressed 
in this article, primarily through an analysis of the International Court of Justice’s 
(‘ICJ’) exposition of their relationship in the landmark Nicaragua case of 1986 
and the United Nations General Assembly (‘UNGA’) resolutions drawn upon 
therein. In light of the examination of these principles in this context, Part III 
discusses the Libyan and Syrian crises in the context of the provision of such 
support. In the absence of a distinct legal right to provide arms and such 
assistance, Part IV addresses whether there are any possible legal grounds upon 
which it might be provided, including supporting the right to self-determination, 
counter-intervention, and unilateral humanitarian intervention with a particular 
focus on the Arab Spring conflicts. Finally, Part V offers some conclusions of a 
broader nature on the contemporary position under international law, particularly 
in light of the emergence of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (‘R2P’) concept, of 
the provision of arms and non-lethal assistance to both governmental and 
opposition forces. 
 
II   THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERVENTION AND NON-USE 
OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROVISION OF ARMS 
AND NON-LETHAL ASSISTANCE  
A   The Existence and Form of the Principle of Non-intervention 
In its most rudimentary form, the principle of non-intervention ‘involves the 
right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside 
                                                 
12  See, eg, Carlo Panara and Gary Wilson (eds), The Arab Spring: New Patterns for Democracy and 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013); Henderson, ‘International Measures for the Protection of 
Civilians’, above n 10; Olivier Corten and Vaios Koutroulis, ‘The Illegality of Military Support to Rebels 
in the Libyan War: Aspects of Jus contra Bellum and Jus in Bello’ (2013) 18 Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law 59; Julian M Lehmann, ‘All Necessary Means to Protect Civilians: What the Intervention in 
Libya Says About the Relationship between the Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum’ (2012) 17 Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law 117; Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘The United Nations, Military Intervention, and 
Regime Change in Libya’ (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 355.  
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interference.’13 It is true that the Charter of the United Nations (‘UN Charter’) 
‘does not explicitly set out a general obligation of non-intervention.’14 However, 
the principle is nonetheless one that has been generally recognised as being 
grounded in customary international law.15 Of course, for a customary legal norm 
to exist a practice exhibiting the existence of the norm and opinio juris 
expressing allegiance to it as a legal principle are formally required elements.16 
As noted above, incidences of the principle of non-intervention being 
contravened in practice are not uncommon. Yet, for the development of a 
customary norm perfect compliance is not necessarily required,17 and it is also 
not immediately apparent whether the two elements have to exist or be 
discernible in equal measure or – following the methodological approach of the 
ICJ in the 1986 Nicaragua case – whether the strong existence of one negates the 
necessity of discerning the other to the same disagree, or even perhaps any 
degree.18 In this respect, despite transgressions of the norm, expressions of opinio 
juris that the principle exists have been consistently and clearly professed by 
states. For example, states have repeatedly reaffirmed that ‘[n]o State has the 
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal 
or external affairs of any other State.’19 As such, while breaches have taken place 
– and continue to do so – the formality, generality and consistency with which 
the broad and non-specific principle of non-intervention has been expressed leads 
                                                 
13  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 106 [202].  
14  Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Principle of Non-intervention: Use of Force’ in Colin Warbrick and Vaughan Lowe 
(eds), The United Nations and the Principles of International Law: Essays in Memory of Michael 
Akehurst (Routledge, 1994) 66, 68. While art 2(7) of the UN Charter states that ‘[n]othing contained in 
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ (emphasis added),  this limitation is not applicable to individual 
Member States themselves. 
15  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 126 [246]; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 6th ed, 2008) 1147. 
16  Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines customary international law as 
‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law.’ See also North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic 
of Germany v Denmark) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 43 [74]. 
17  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 98 [186]. 
18  In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that expressions of opinio juris regarding the existence of the 
prohibition of the use of force had been made so clearly in certain UNGA resolutions that it did not feel 
the need to provide an examination of state practice to support this claim: see ibid 99 [188]. On the other 
hand, Michael Glennon has claimed that physical state practice is sufficient to indicate that the 
prohibition of the use of force has fallen into desuetude, despite states expressing their adherence to it: 
see generally Michael J Glennon, ‘How International Rules Die’ (2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 
939. 
19  See, eg, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res 2131 (XX), UN GAOR, 20th sess, 1408th plen 
mtg, Agenda Item 107, UN Doc A/RES/20/2131 (21 December 1965) para 1 (‘Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention’); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 
2625 (XXV), UN GAOR, 25th sess, 1883rd plen mtg, Agenda Item 85, UN Doc A/Res/25/2625 (24 
October 1970) annex (‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations’); 
Charter of the Organization of American States, signed 30 April 1948, 119 UNTS 3 (entered into force 
13 December 1951) art 19 (‘Charter of the Organization of American States’). 
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one to conclude that it is a principle of international law the existence of which 
states as a whole wish to proclaim. 
 
B   Intervention in Support of Governmental Forces 
While the principle of non-intervention is framed here in the context of state 
sovereignty, this is in some ways misleading as it is in actual fact governmental 
as opposed to state sovereignty that is really in issue. In other words, states are 
permitted per se to intervene in the affairs of another state, providing it is at the 
invitation or with the consent of the government of the state concerned.20 In this 
sense, military assistance may be ‘rendered by one state to another at the latter’s 
request and with its consent, which may be given ad hoc or in advance by 
treaty.’21 Consequently, states are generally considered free to – and regularly do 
– provide various forms of military assistance, including arms, to the government 
of another state and its armed forces.22 
The majority of arms are transferred between states through the arms trade.23 
While this trade has traditionally been relatively unregulated, UN Member States 
adopted the text of an historic treaty at the UNGA in April 2013 which sought to 
add some regulation to the trade in conventional arms.24 In particular, The Arms 
Trade Treaty prohibits states from exporting conventional weapons in violation 
of arms embargoes, or weapons that would be used for acts of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes or terrorism.25 Furthermore, it requires states to 
prevent conventional weapons from reaching the black market.26 Thus, while at 
the time of writing, the Treaty has only been signed by 79 states and ratified by 
two and so is not as yet in force, when operational it will provide an overarching 
governing framework to the trade in arms between states which remains a lawful 
– indeed thriving – trade.  
 
                                                 
20  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 126 [246]; Shaw, above n 15, 1151. While it may be argued that this rule 
exists due to the government being a legitimate representative of the people of the state concerned, it 
applies as much to autocratic regimes as it does to those of a democratic nature. However, see below Part 
IV(D) for the potential exception to the intervention by invitation rule in the context of civil wars. On 
intervention by invitation, see generally Doswald-Beck, above n 1. On intervention by invitation in the 
civil war context, see generally Eliav Lieblich, International Law and Civil Wars: Intervention and 
Consent (Routledge, 2013). 
21  Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (Longman, 9th ed, 1996) 
vol 1, 435. 
22  The provision of such assistance is not, however, limited to recognised states. Indeed, the US and other 
states sell arms to Taiwan which is only recognised by 23 states (none of whom are those which provide 
it with arms). See Christian Henderson, ‘Contested States and the Rights and Obligations of the Jus ad 
Bellum’ (2013) 21 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 367, 405. 
23  See generally Zeray Yihdego, The Arms Trade and International Law (Hart Publishing, 2007). 
24  Draft Decision Submitted by the President of the Final Conference, UN GAOR, UN Doc 
A/CONF.217/2013/L.3 (27 March 2013) annex (‘The Arms Trade Treaty’). It was adopted 154–3–23. 
Syria, Iran and North Korea, which ultimately voted against its adoption, had previously prevented it 
from being adopted by consensus. 
25  Ibid art 6. 
26  Ibid art 8. 
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C   Intervention in Support of Opposition Forces: 
The Element of Coercion and the Use of Force 
In contrast to the right of governments to invite or consent to intervention, 
and as the ICJ has continuously held, there is no ‘right for States to intervene, 
directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal 
opposition in another State’,27 as such an intervention would be considered a 
violation of the sovereignty of the state concerned. In this respect, the principle 
of non-intervention 
would certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention were to 
be justified by a mere request for assistance made by an opposition group in 
another State. … Indeed, it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of 
non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at 
the request of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of 
the opposition. This would permit any State to intervene at any moment in the 
internal affairs of another State, whether at the request of the government or at the 
request of its opposition. Such a situation does not in the Court’s view correspond 
to the present state of international law.28 
However, an important element of the Court’s exposition of the principle of 
non-intervention in 1986 is that a transgression occurs only once the act of 
intervention takes on a form of ‘coercion’ and is one that bears ‘on matters in 
which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide 
freely’, for example a state’s political, economic, social and cultural choices.29 
Thus while states, for example, regularly comment upon situations that are 
occurring in another state, the principle of non-intervention only becomes 
engaged once the intervening state seeks to coerce that state into making certain 
choices or taking – or being subjected to – certain actions. Although ‘[i]t is the 
intention, rather than the means adopted, which may qualify a State’s action as 
unlawful intervention,’30 it nonetheless stands to reason that, as the ICJ noted, 
‘[t]he element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, 
prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention 
which uses force.’31 Interventions involving such physical coercion, which 
constitutes a more specific form of intervention, are something that is 
independently prohibited in article 2(4) of the UN Charter.32 Furthermore, the 
prohibition of the threat or use of force is generally recognised as having special 
weight within the international community, with many categorising it as a norm 
                                                 
27  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 108 [206] (emphasis added); Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, 227 [164] 
(‘Armed Activities’). 
28  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 126 [246].  
29  Ibid 108 [205]; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, UN Doc A/RES/20/2131 paras 1–2, 5; 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, UN Doc A/Res/25/2625 
annex para 1 principle 3. 
30  Lowe, above n 14, 67. 
31  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 108 [205] (emphasis added). See generally ibid. 
32  This provision states that ‘[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ 
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of jus cogens,33 and others terming the rule’s treaty presence a ‘cornerstone’ 
provision of the UN Charter.34 In this respect, states have repeatedly condemned 
in principle ‘armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted 
threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and 
cultural elements.’35 
 
D   Indirect Force: The Provision of Arms and Non-lethal Assistance 
While the use of force may be ‘in the direct form of military action’ using the 
armed forces of the intervening state, or other forces under the effective control 
of the state,36 it may also be ‘in the indirect form of support for subversive or 
terrorist armed activities within another State.’37 In its treatment of the ‘indirect 
form’ of the use of force in the Nicaragua case the ICJ made a further distinction, 
in that 
while the arming and training of [opposition forces] can certainly be said to 
involve the threat or use of force against [the state concerned] … [T]he Court 
considers that the mere supply of funds to [opposition forces], while undoubtedly 
an act of intervention in the internal affairs of [the state concerned] … does not in 
itself amount to a use of force.38 
As Schmitt notes, ‘[i]n what was tantamount to an application of agency 
theory, the Court determined that force apparently includes actively and directly 
preparing another to apply armed force, but not merely funding the effort.’39 
Indeed, while the provision of arms to non-state actors and opposition forces was 
firmly positioned by the Court as constituting both an unlawful intervention and 
an unlawful use of force,40 there was something of a divide in the seriousness of 
the provision of different forms of non-lethal assistance. Although the provision 
                                                 
33  The International Law Commission expressed the view that ‘the law of the Charter concerning the 
prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law 
having the character of jus cogens’: ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 
Eighteenth Session’ [1966] II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 172, 247. Furthermore, the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case noted that the prohibition of the use of force ‘is frequently referred to in 
statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of customary international law but also a 
fundamental or cardinal principle of such law’: Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 100 [190] (emphasis 
added). See also Shaw, above n 15, 126. 
34  J L Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (Clarendon Press, 6th 
revised ed, 1963) 414. 
35  Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, UN Doc A/RES/20/2131 para 1; Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, UN Doc A/Res/25/2625 annex para 1 
principle 3 (emphasis added). 
36  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 108 [205]. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid 119 [228]. 
39  Michael N Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a 
Normative Framework’ (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 885, 909. 
40  The main reason for the opposition of certain states to the Arms Trade Treaty noted above, in particular 
Syria and Russia, was that it did not address, and more specifically did not expressly prohibit, the 
provision of arms to ‘non-state terrorist groups’ within a state. If the Treaty had addressed this issue, it 
would have expressly affirmed its illegality. However, it was not, upon the basis of the analysis here, 
strictly necessary to do so. See ‘UN Passes Historic Arms Trade Treaty by Huge Majority’, BBC News 
(online), 2 April 2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21998394>. 
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of training was similarly held by the Court as constituting both an unlawful 
intervention and an unlawful use of force, the supply of funds in itself was 
classified as a lesser act of unlawful intervention. 
However, the provision of non-lethal equipment, as a form of non-lethal 
assistance, was not specifically raised and given treatment by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case, and neither has it been treated in any other case or advisory 
opinion before the Court, or indeed before any other court or tribunal. In this 
respect – and given that neither the general concept of non-lethal assistance nor 
any specific manifestations of it have been discussed fully in the international 
legal literature – whether the provision of non-lethal equipment in itself 
constitutes an unlawful intervention or unlawful use of force, or perhaps even 
neither, has not been entirely clarified. In addition, and in addressing this issue, 
there is also no clear and comprehensive discernible definition of what is 
incorporated under the notion of non-lethal equipment. On this point, however, 
the debate regarding the provision of such assistance in the Arab Spring context 
might indicate that it includes equipment such as radio communications 
equipment, non-armoured vehicles, and body armour.41 That is, equipment that 
while not having the primary aim of taking life nonetheless is provided with the 
aim of assisting the party concerned to prevail in an armed conflict, or at least to 
possess some (or better) capabilities to defend itself. 
The concept of non-lethal equipment would thus appear at first sight to be 
positioned somewhere between the provision of ‘arms and training’, which 
constitutes a use of force under the Court’s conceptual framework, and the 
‘supply of funds’, which does not, but does constitute, nonetheless, an unlawful 
intervention. Indeed, the former of these two forms of assistance appears to be 
specifically targeted towards directly assisting the non-state actors in their armed 
insurgency against the government of the state, while the latter does not appear to 
have the same intended immediate and direct effect, and is instead arguably 
representative of a state’s support for the overall aims of the non-state actors. In 
this respect, non-lethal equipment of the type highlighted above has a more 
specific use than the mere supply of funds and, while not of a lethal nature, is to 
be used in situations in which an armed struggle is taking place. 
The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations, which the ICJ took as representing customary international 
law, is instructive here in that it states in the context of the use of force that 
‘[e]very state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State … when the 
acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.’42 
As noted above, the ICJ has expressly held that the supply of funds does not 
in itself constitute an unlawful use of force, even, it can be assumed, if the 
opposition forces are engaged in acts of civil strife of a forcible nature. However, 
                                                 
41  See below Part III. 
42  Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, UN Doc A/Res/25/2625, 
annex para 1 principle 1 (emphasis added). 
650 UNSW Law Journal Volume 36(2) 
it is suggested here that upon the basis of the more immediate and direct impact 
upon the forcible actions of the opposition forces on the ground, that the 
provision of non-lethal equipment in the same circumstances would arguably 
constitute in itself an unlawful use of force, over and above an unlawful 
intervention. 
 
E   Non-lethal Equipment as Humanitarian Aid? 
Non-lethal equipment might also be provided, however, specifically for 
humanitarian or protective purposes. In this sense the humanitarian as opposed to 
the combative purpose behind the provision of non-lethal equipment is 
emphasised. Yet, the ICJ was clear that it was only ‘the provision of strictly 
humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country’ that ‘cannot be regarded 
as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law.’43 
In defining what constituted ‘strictly humanitarian aid’, the Court drew upon US 
legislation, which limited aid to the Contra forces in Nicaragua to such 
assistance, and which defined it as: the provision of food, clothing, medicine, and 
other humanitarian assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapons, 
weapons systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, or material which 
can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death.44 
Yet this, as the ICJ’s adopted typology of ‘humanitarian aid’, does not really 
clarify the issue as to whether the provision of non-lethal equipment such as 
radio communications equipment or body armour should escape censure as an 
unlawful act. While it is not of a similar nature to the types of humanitarian 
assistance expressly included here, in the case of equipment such as body armour 
it would, given its restricted defensive as opposed to offensive use, arguably be 
more accurately described as equipment of a humanitarian nature rather than 
‘material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death.’ 
However, such aid should, in any case, be distributed impartially to those in 
need ‘whatever their political affiliations or objectives.’45 As such, regardless of 
whether it is to be classified as one or the other, assuming that it is provided by a 
state solely to the opposition forces it would nonetheless constitute at the very 
least an unlawful intervention. 
 
                                                 
43  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 124 [242] (emphasis added). 
44  International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub L No 99–83, § 722(g), 99 Stat 
190, quoted in ibid 125 [243]. 
45  Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 124 [242]. Indeed, the Court noted at [243] that 
  [a]n essential feature of truly humanitarian aid is that it is given ‘without discrimination’of any kind. In the view of 
the Court, if the provision of ‘humanitarian assistance’ is to escape condemnation as an intervention in the internal 
affairs of Nicaragua, not only must it be limited to the purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross, namely 
‘to prevent and alleviate human suffering’, and ‘to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human 
being’; it must also, and above all, be given without discrimination to al1 in need in Nicaragua, not merely to the 
contras and their dependents. 
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F   The Legal and Political Distinction between Intervention  
and Use of Force 
While this section has set out the rubric under which an assessment can be 
made as to the legality of the provision of arms and non-lethal assistance to both 
governmental and opposition forces, the question is raised as to the significance, 
theoretically and practically, of distinguishing between general acts of 
intervention and those specific forms which constitute a use of force, particularly 
in the context of support for opposition forces. 
As will have been ascertained thus far, international law provides for 
different normative levels of severity in connection with the act of intervention. 
In terms of the legal consequences attached to a breach of the principle of non-
intervention, in both its general or more specific forcible variety, victim states are 
generally restricted to resorting to non-forcible countermeasures, although in the 
case of a use of force graver countermeasures may well be justified than in the 
case of a lesser intervention.46 However, a breach of the prohibition of the use of 
force does at least open the door to the victim state being able to respond 
forcibly. Indeed, in the context of the topic under discussion in this article, if the 
forcible actions of the opposition forces are of a certain gravity, represent 
something that might be carried out by the forces of a state, and are controlled by 
the state concerned, then they may be classified as an ‘armed attack’.47 Only at 
this point can the victim state take forcible action by invoking its right of self-
defence, whereas this door, or indeed any leading to a forcible response of any 
type, is clearly shut to states who are victims of lesser violations of the 
prohibition of intervention norm. 
However, much of the effectiveness and significance of international law is 
based upon perception and reciprocity. It is perhaps here where the distinction 
between intervention and force becomes relevant as for the intervening state 
concerned the gravity of the particular intervention will affect how it is perceived 
by others, and perhaps, the possibilities for future cooperation. In this respect, a 
use of force can be considered to be ‘normatively more flagrant’ than an 
intervention for a number of reasons.48 First, the principle of non-intervention is, 
of course, and as noted above, a customary rule rather than a treaty-based rule.49 
Normatively speaking, this makes little difference, but in fact arguably means 
that it is inherently perceived as being normatively weaker, vaguer, and more 
malleable than the prohibition of the use of force which is represented in both 
treaty and customary law. Secondly, coercive acts employing the use of force 
                                                 
46  There have been suggestions that the ICJ made implicit reference to countermeasures of a forcible variety 
in the Nicaragua case, when it indicated that in the situation of a use of force not amounting to the gravity 
of an ‘armed attack’, a state may be justified in resorting to ‘proportionate countermeasures’: see ibid 127 
[249]; James A Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in International Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2009) 54–60. 
47  See Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 103 [195]. 
48  Schmitt, above n 39, 909. 
49  That is, aside from its inclusion in the Charter of the Organization of American States. 
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represent ‘those the [international] community most abhors’.50 This is 
demonstrated, as noted above, through the prohibition of the threat or use of 
force being generally perceived as having special weight, in particular as a jus 
cogens norm.51 Thirdly, the use of force is perhaps perceived more negatively ‘by 
virtue of its far greater consequence-instrument congruence.’52 Armed coercion, 
whether through the direct use of force or by providing arms and/or certain forms 
of non-lethal assistance to opposition forces in their use of force, often results in 
death or serious injury and/or destruction of physical property,53 whereas an 
unlawful intervention falling below a use of force is less likely to do so. Fourthly, 
an unlawful use of force risks escalating a conflict far more than a lesser 
(normatively speaking) unlawful intervention. This is due to the direct and 
immediate impact that the provision of arms and/or certain forms of non-lethal 
assistance can have upon the forcible actions of the opposition groups. Indeed, 
‘the consequences of [a] use of force are almost immediately apparent’, whereas 
those of an unlawful intervention ‘although severe, emerge much more slowly, 
and thereby allow opportunity for reflection and resolution.’54 
 
G   Acceptance and Confirmation of the Rules on the Provision of Arms  
and Non-lethal Assistance between the Nicaragua Case  
and the Arab Spring 
The basic principles on the provision of arms and non-lethal assistance as 
enunciated and clarified by the ICJ in the 1986 Nicaragua case were based more 
on principle and the broad and general opinio juris extrapolated from UNGA 
resolutions and the Charter of the Organization of American States than on the 
physical manifestations of state practice that had been witnessed in the UN 
Charter era up to that point. They have, nonetheless, been accepted with virtually 
no dissent. As Corten, writing as recently as 2010, observed, ‘[t]he principle that 
one cannot help rebels … does not seem to be contested by anyone, and 
controversies are more about the level above which such aid may be 
characterised as “armed attack” opening up the right to self-defence.’55 Lieblich 
further notes that ‘[m]uch of the contemporary understanding of the scope of the 
principle [of non-intervention] is traced to the 1986 [ICJ] landmark ruling in the 
Nicaragua case.’56 Indeed, between the Nicaragua case and the Arab Spring, as 
with the Cold War era, states have not generally expressed any support for an 
                                                 
50  Schmitt, above n 39, 912. 
51  See above Part II(D). 
52  Schmitt, above n 39, 911. 
53  Ibid. 
54  Ibid 911–12. 
55  Olivier Corten, The Law against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law (Hart Publishing, 2010) 130. Whether the provision of arms and non-lethal assistance 
can rise to the level of an armed attack revolves more around the extent to which the actions of the non-
state actors can be attributed to the states involved and not whether the provision of arms and/or non-
lethal assistance is in itself sufficient to give rise to an armed attack. Such a question is therefore beyond 
the scope of this article. 
56  Lieblich, above n 20, 42. 
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alteration of the principle of non-intervention so as to provide them with the right 
to provide arms and non-lethal military assistance to opposition forces, in or 
outside of a civil war, and neither have they generally justified such action upon 
another controversial legal ground.57 For example, the support of Iran and Syria 
to Hezbollah in Lebanon has largely been covert,58 while support by Rwanda and 
Uganda to rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, when 
acknowledged, was largely justified upon the basis of self-defence.59 Thus, the 
subsequent practice to contradict such an interpretation of the prohibition of the 
use of force norm in article 2(4) of the UN Charter,60 or the state practice and 
opinio juris necessary to modify the customary principle of non-intervention and 
the prohibition of the use of force,61 has not been discernible. As such, not only 
can the events of the Arab Spring be analysed under this framework as 
representing lex lata legal rules at the time, but the rules themselves can also be 
reassessed in light of these events in order to discern any reinterpretations or 
modifications to them. 
 
III   THE PROVISION OF ARMS AND ‘NON-LETHAL’ 
ASSISTANCE IN THE ARAB SPRING 
As is now well known, the Arab Spring began in 2011 with the eruption of 
uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt, which ultimately led to the toppling of the 
governmental regimes in each state and the installation of new ones.62 The 
provision of arms and non-lethal assistance was not an issue in these initial 
uprisings, or those that have since occurred in other states such as Yemen, 
Bahrain and Morocco.63 Indeed, this only became significant in the context of the 
                                                 
57  On such grounds see below Part IV. 
58  See, eg, Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, ‘Syria Is Shipping Scud Missiles to Hezbollah’, Haaretz 
(online), 13 April 2010 <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/syria-is-shipping-scud-missiles-to-
hezbollah-1.284141>; ‘Syria: Israel’s Scud Accusation May Be Pretense for Attack’, Haaretz, 15 April 
2010 <http://www.haaretz.com/news/syria-israel-s-scud-accusation-may-be-pretense-for-attack-
1.284315>. 
59  The justification was rejected by the ICJ in the case of Uganda’s support for the Congo Liberation 
Movement rebels (Mouvement de Libération du Congo): see Armed Activities [2005] ICJ Rep 168, 227 
[164]–[165]. 
60  On subsequent practice as a means of interpreting treaties, see Art 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 
1980). 
61  On these two requirements for the formation and modification of customary international law, see above 
Part II(A). 
62  See ‘Arab Uprising: Country by Country – Tunisia’, BBC News (online), 31 August 2012 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482315>; ‘Arab Uprising: Country by Country – Egypt’, BBC 
News (online), 31 August 2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482291>. 
63  Saudi Arabia directly, as opposed to indirectly, intervened in support of the governing regime in Bahrain 
in March 2011: see William Butler, ‘Saudi Arabian Intervention in Bahrain Driven by Visceral Sunni 
Fear of Shias’, The Guardian (online), 20 March 2011 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ 
 mar/20/bahrain-saudi-arabia-rebellion>. 
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civil war and outside intervention that took place in Libya and the uprising and 
civil war that continues (at the time of writing) in Syria. 
 
A   Libya  
On 17 March 2011, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (‘NATO’) forces 
were authorised by the UNSC in Resolution 1973 to use ‘all necessary measures’ 
to ‘protect civilians and civilian populated areas’.64 Such an authorisation by the 
UNSC is a now well-accepted euphemism in the practice of the Council 
signifying permission to use force to achieve a specified goal, in this case the 
protection of civilians.65 As noted above, force, as set out by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case, can be used directly, in the form of states acting through their 
own armed forces, or indirectly, in the form of the supply of arms and other 
forms of assistance to non-state forces.66 In this sense, the authorisation provided 
in Resolution 1973 did not state a preference for either modality in carrying out 
the mandate.67 While the use of force was at first used directly by NATO in the 
protection of civilians in Libya,68 it soon became clear that the armed forces of 
the acting states were in effect – and controversially – directly aiding the 
opposition forces to topple the Gaddafi regime through such measures.69 Yet 
there was also much debate as to whether the authorisation contained within this 
particular resolution permitted, in addition to the direct forcible measures to 
protect civilians, indirect assistance through the provision of arms and ‘non-
lethal’ assistance to the opposition forces in Libya.70 
The key issue in this respect was whether the authorisation provided in 
Resolution 1973 overrode the arms embargo that had been imposed earlier in 
Resolution 1970.71 In paragraph nine of Resolution 1970, it was 
[decided] that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to 
prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their 
flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including 
weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary 
equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, 
training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, 
maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of 
armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories… 
Yet Resolution 1973 subsequently went on to authorise ‘Member States … to 
take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 
(2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in 
                                                 
64  SC Res 1973, UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6498th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) para 4 
(‘Resolution 1973’). 
65  See Christian Henderson, The Persistent Advocate and the Use of Force: The Impact of the United States 
upon the Jus ad Bellum in the Post-Cold War Era (Ashgate, 2010) 42–51. 
66  See above Part II(D). 
67  Henderson, ‘International Measures for the Protection of Civilians’, above n 10, 770. 
68  See Corten and Koutroulis, above n 12, 69–71. 
69  Ibid 71–7. 
70  See, eg, Henderson, ‘International Measures for the Protection of Civilians’, above n 10, 769–72. 
71  SC Res 1970, UN SCOR, 6491st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) (‘Resolution 1970’). 
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the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.’72 The question then was what types of indirect 
assistance, if any, were Member States permitted to provide in the process of 
fulfilling their mandate of protecting civilians, whether that be in response to the 
actions of either the government or opposition forces. 
 
1  Training 
While an ‘occupation force’ was specifically precluded from the ‘means’ 
authorised in Resolution 1973,73 some NATO Member States involved in the 
campaign sent military personnel to the eastern rebel stronghold of Benghazi to 
‘advise’ the opposition forces on logistics and intelligence training.74 Under the 
ICJ’s conceptual framework, as set out above in Part II, the provision of this form 
of non-lethal assistance constituted an unlawful use of force, and thus a violation 
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Furthermore, the arms embargo in Resolution 
1970 also specifically and expressly precluded ‘technical assistance, training, 
financial or other assistance, related to military activities’.75 The training 
provided by the Member States on this occasion thus seemed to fall foul of both 
the general prohibition of the use of force and the specific terms of a UNSC 
resolution. 
Yet, as noted above, Resolution 1973 provided for the use of ‘all necessary 
means’ to protect civilians and civilian populated areas ‘notwithstanding’ the 
paragraph containing the arms embargo and prohibition on the provision of 
training. Under the lex specialis principle the specifics of the UNSC Resolution 
authorising the use of ‘all necessary means’ would thus seem to provide an 
exception to the non-intervention and non-use of force principles as well as the 
earlier UNSC imposed arms embargo, therefore making the provision of training 
lawful if, of course, it was necessary and used to protect civilians. However, 
given that the training was provided not to the civilians of Benghazi or Misrata in 
order to be better able to protect themselves, but instead to the forces of one party 
in a non-international armed conflict fighting to secure a change of regime, this 
would seem somewhat questionable. This was perhaps further confirmed by the 
publication of a joint letter by President Obama, President Sarkozy and Prime 
Minister Cameron on 15 April 2011 in which it was stated that the length of the 
operation would be determined by the time Colonel Gaddafi was to remain in 
power, thus making clear that the intentions of the intervening states were 
                                                 
72  Resolution 1973, UN Doc S/RES/1973, para 4 (emphasis added). 
73  Ibid. 
74  The states involved in sending such personnel were principally the United Kingdom (‘UK’), France and 
Italy: see John Pienaar, ‘Libya: MPs’ Concerns over “Mission Creep” Grow’, BBC News (online), 20 
April 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13142441>; ‘Libya: France and Italy to Send 
Officers to Aid Rebels’, BBC News (online), 20 April 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
13143988>. However, there were reports that CIA and British Special Forces had been in Libya long 
before this announcement: see ‘Obama Authorises Covert Aid to Libyan Rebels – Reports’, BBC News 
(online), 31 March 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12915401>.  
75  See SC Res 1970, UN SCOR, 66th sess, 6491st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) (‘Resolution 
1970’) para 9 (emphasis added).  
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somewhat broader than simply the protection of civilians on the ground during 
this period of civil unrest.76 
 
2  ‘Non-lethal’ Equipment 
As the intervention in Libya progressed it also subsequently emerged that 
‘non-lethal’ military equipment – mainly in the form of body armour and satellite 
telephones – was also being provided to the opposition forces.77 Despite a lack of 
authoritative clarity on the issue of the general legality of the provision of such 
equipment,78 it is argued in this article that the supply of non-lethal equipment 
not only constitutes an unlawful intervention but in addition constitutes an 
unlawful indirect use of force through reasoning by analogy with the conceptual 
framework set out by the ICJ. This is particularly the case given that the 
opposition forces were engaged in a use of force and the equipment supplied was 
to aid them in that respect. 
However, paragraph 9 of Resolution 1970, in setting out the arms embargo, 
and in making a distinction between offensive and defensive military equipment, 
determined that the embargo was not to apply to ‘non-lethal military equipment 
intended solely for humanitarian or protective use’79 Indeed, the arms embargo 
could be read as significant in its inclusion of what might be termed a ‘defensive 
arms’ exception. The problem with the inclusion of such an exception, however, 
is that it implies that the provision of non-lethal military equipment would be 
lawful not only under the arms embargo but also under the principles of non-
intervention and non-use of force. Indeed, in compounding this assumption, the 
fact that it specifically qualified the ‘equipment’ as being of a ‘military’ nature 
implies that it would be distributed to those engaged in civil unrest, confirming 
its provision as constitutive of a use of force. 
However, the second half of this exception adds a further qualification to the 
type of non-lethal military equipment intended to be covered, in that it is 
expressly stated that the equipment should be ‘intended solely for humanitarian 
or protective use.’ It was noted above that the provision of protective non-lethal 
military equipment would arguably qualify as humanitarian aid and would thus 
not, in principle at least, fall foul of the prohibitions of intervention and use of 
force. For this to be the case it would need to be distributed purely based upon 
need and without discrimination, yet in the case of Libya such equipment was 
                                                 
76  Allegra Stratton, ‘Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy: No Let-up in Libya until Gaddafi Departs’, The 
Guardian (online), 15 April 2011 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/15/obama-sarkozy-
cameron-libya>.  
77  UK Prime Minister David Cameron claimed that Resolution 1973 permitted ‘assisting the rebels with 
non-lethal equipment’: see ‘Cameron: Libya UN Resolution Makes Mission “Difficult”‘, BBC News 
(online), 17 April 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13107834>. Furthermore, US officials 
told the Associated Press that the Obama Administration had decided to give the rebels $25 million in 
‘non-lethal assistance’ after assessing their capabilities and intentions: see  ‘Libya: France and Italy to 
Send Officers to Aid Rebels’, above n 74.  
78  See above Part II. 
79  Resolution 1970, UN Doc S/RES/1970 para 9 (a). 
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distributed solely amongst members of the opposition forces and not those loyal 
to the Gaddafi regime. 
Nevertheless, this express recognition that such equipment was not caught by 
the arms embargo, along with the authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ to 
protect civilians in Resolution 1973, arguably meant that under the lex specialis 
principle, as with the provision of training above, the UNSC Resolutions had 
provided an exception to the non-intervention and non-use of force principles 
thus making the provision of this sort of non-lethal military equipment on this 
occasion lawful. However, again, this was only upon the basis that it could be 
demonstrated that the equipment was provided in the protection of civilians, as 
required by the authorisation in Resolution 1973. The fact that it was, as with the 
provision of training above, ultimately provided to a single party to a non-
international armed conflict, and not directly to civilians, and with the suppliers 
of the equipment claiming that they would continue with their operations until 
regime change had been achieved, puts significant question marks over the 
legality of the provision of such equipment in this particular case. This is, of 
course, unless one accepts the proposition that civilians would only be protected 
in the longer term if Gaddafi was no longer in power. 
 
3  Arms 
While the UK and other acting states only ever expressly acknowledged 
providing training and non-lethal equipment to the opposition forces, it emerged 
that France had gone beyond this and provided weapons of a lethal variety.80 
Between the adoption of Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011 and Resolution 
1973 on 17 March 2011, the provision of arms had become clearly and expressly 
prohibited by paragraph nine of Resolution 1970. Indeed, the arms embargo 
prohibited the transfer of weapons to Libyan territory, meaning that the provision 
of arms to either the Gaddafi regime or the opposition forces was strictly 
prohibited under a UNSC obligation.81 After the adoption of Resolution 1973 on 
17 March 2011, however, the issue became whether the provision of arms was 
permitted if necessary for the protection of civilians. In other words, did the 
authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ really mean all necessary means? 
Given that it was generally accepted that it was the forces of the Gaddafi 
regime that were posing the main threat to civilians, the imposition of the arms 
embargo signified that the provision of arms to the Gaddafi regime was strictly 
prohibited.82 As such, and as with the provision of training and non-lethal 
                                                 
80  Richard Spencer, ‘France Supplying Weapons to Libyan Rebels’, The Telegraph (online), 29 June 2011 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8606541/France-supplying-
weapons-to-Libyan-rebels.html>. 
81  Art 25 of the UN Charter provides that ‘[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.’ 
82  Although China had reportedly offered to sell arms to the Gaddafi Rregime in Libya in July 2011 in 
contravention of the UNSC arms embargo: see ‘Libya: Chinese Denies Defying UN Arms Embargo’, The 
Telegraph (online), 5 September 2011 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
 africaandindianocean/libya/8742833/Libya-Chinese-denies-defying-UN-arms-embargo.html>. 
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military equipment above, it appeared that arms might be lawfully provided to 
the opposition forces if they were to be used solely for the protection of civilians. 
The problem, again, with this argument is that it was not the civilians themselves 
that were being provided with the weapons. Indeed, while the direct action 
undertaken by the intervening forces may be construed as offering such 
protection, the provision of weapons to the opposition forces could only be 
interpreted, at best, as delegating the task of protecting civilians out to others, or 
upon a less favourable interpretation, assisting an organised opposition force to 
prevail in a civil war. As noted above, the joint statement by the leaders of the 
UK, the US, and – significantly in this context – France, seemed to indicate that 
the latter interpretation was the method in which it was believed the protection of 
civilians would ultimately be secured. However, if the prospect of regime change 
proved controversial amongst states, the prospect of achieving this through the 
provision of arms also proved controversial, including amongst members of the 
UNSC.83 Echoing this sentiment was the NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, who was clear when he said that ‘[w]e are not in Libya to arm 
people. We are in Libya to protect civilians against attacks.’84  
There are perhaps two things that seem clear following the expansive 
interpretation given to the mandate in Libya by certain NATO Member States. 
First, the type of force must be directed exclusively towards achieving the 
specific aim of the mandate provided, in this case the protection of ‘civilians or 
civilian populated areas’. As such, any actions undertaken by the Coalition which 
had the aim of achieving other goals constituted a use of force taken outside of 
the terms of the Resolution, and were thus unlawful. If such actions involved the 
provision of training or arms, then these were specifically caught by the arms 
embargo. Secondly, and as argued by the author elsewhere,85 given that the 
resolutions are drafted and adopted by the Council Members themselves, any 
interpretation and implementation of their provisions needs to be agreed upon by 
the Council if they are to be deemed lawful. As the interventions in Iraq in 2003 
and Libya in 2011 vividly demonstrated, unilateral stretching of the boundaries 
of the UNSC resolutions beyond those intended has negative consequences for 
future multilateral action. The lack of decisive action by the Council in Syria is a 
stark reminder of this, and in particular, of the fallout of the unilateral expansive 
interpretations given by some to the Resolutions in Libya. 
 
                                                 
83  It was reported that even the UK feared that supplying arms to the rebels could be considered a breach of 
Resolution 1973: see Keesing’s Worldwide, ‘Jun 2011 – Continuing Civil War’ [2011] Keesing’s Record 
of World Events 50539; Bruno Waterfield, ‘Libya: Legal Implications of Arming the Rebels’, The 
Telegraph (online), 30 March 2011 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
 africaandindianocean/libya/8416856/Libya-legal-implications-of-arming-the-rebels.html>. 
84  Niall Paterson, ‘Confusion Reigns over Arming Libyan Rebels’, Sky News (online), 31 March 
2011<http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/15963069>. 
85  See Henderson, The Persistent Advocate and the Use of Force, above n 65; Henderson, ‘International 
Measures for the Protection of Civilians’, above n 10. 
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B   Syria  
The civil war in Syria has witnessed much hesitation on the part of the 
international community. The UNSC has not imposed a general arms embargo as 
it did in Libya and there has certainly been no sign of a resolution being adopted 
of a similar nature as that of Resolution 1973.86 This led Susan Rice, upon 
leaving her role as US Ambassador to the UN on 26 June 2013, to comment that 
the inaction of the UNSC in Syria was a ‘stain’ upon the reputation of the body.87  
In the absence of an authorising resolution from the UNSC, the situation in 
Syria thus raises legal questions regarding the provision of support to both the 
government and opposition forces involved, but which relate more directly to the 
principles of non-intervention and non-use of force in the international 
community. While, as noted above, the UNSC has not imposed an arms embargo 
in the context of this conflict, the European Union (‘EU’) adopted an arms 
embargo upon the territory of Syria in May 2011 shortly after the civil unrest had 
begun.88 The following analysis is consequently divided into two sub-sections, 
with the first focusing upon the positions, actions and obligations of EU states 
and the second on those of non-EU states. 
 
1   EU States 
On 9 May 2011, the EU imposed an arms embargo upon the entire territory 
of Syria – banning the supply by its members of ‘equipment which might be used 
for internal repression … to any person, entity or body in Syria or for use in 
Syria.’89 A list of such equipment was included in an annex to the Regulation and 
included, alongside traditional lethal equipment such as firearms, ammunition 
and explosive materials and devices, equipment that might more accurately be 
described as ‘non-lethal’, such as vehicles and protective equipment including 
body armour and helmets.90 Interestingly, the Regulation also provided ‘[b]y way 
of derogation’ that Member States ‘may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or 
export of equipment which might be used for internal repression, under such 
                                                 
86  Speculation can be made as to the real reasons for this hesitation. However, it is perhaps safe to say that 
they arguably include the disagreements over the interpretation of Resolution 1973 in Libya, the interests 
of Russia, China and the US in the region, the potential for an even greater refugee flow from Syria into 
neighbouring states, and the possibility of intervention in the conflict by neighbouring states and non-
state actors. 
87  ‘Susan Rice: Syria Inaction a “Stain” on Security Council’, BBC News (online), 26 June 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23057745>. 
88  See below Part III(B)(1). 
89  Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 of 9 May 2011 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in 
Syria [2011] OJ L 121/1, art 2(1)(a) (‘Regulation (EU) No 442/2011’). See also ‘EU Imposes Arms 
Embargo on Syria’, The Guardian (online), 10 May 2011 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
 2011/may/09/syria-european-union-arms-embargo>. 
90  On 15 October 2012 the EU tightened the embargo so as to prohibit the importation of Syrian weapons to 
Europe, the transportation of them anywhere or the supply of any financial services such as insurance to 
fund purchases of Syrian arms. See Justyna Pawlak and Sebastian Moffett, ‘EU Tightens Sanctions on 
Syrian Arms Industry’, Reuters (online), 15 October 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
 10/15/syria-crisis-eu-idUSL5E8LFLZC20121015>. 
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conditions as they deem appropriate, if they determine that such equipment is 
intended solely for humanitarian or protective use.’91 This would seem, at face 
value at least, to provide the necessary loophole to enable states to provide arms 
and non-lethal equipment to the opposition forces in Syria if it was argued that 
they were intended ‘solely for humanitarian or protective use.’ Although perhaps 
unlikely, the requirement that humanitarian aid be distributed non-
discriminatively, as discussed above in Part II(E), may have deterred the use of 
this as a loophole by EU states for its provision solely to the opposition forces. 
Nevertheless, the UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague, informed the UK 
Parliament on 10 January 2013 that he sought to amend the arms embargo so that 
‘additional assistance’ would be available to the opposition forces.92 After 
pressure by certain states, the embargo was modified on 28 February 2013 so as 
to permit the provision of non-lethal military equipment, such as armoured 
vehicles, and technical aid to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces (‘Syrian National Coalition’),93 provided that they were 
intended to protect civilians.94 In response to these changes to the terms of the 
EU’s arms embargo, William Hague announced to the Parliament on 6 March 
2013 that in addition to search and rescue equipment, communications 
equipment, and disease-prevention materials, the UK would also send ‘non-lethal 
military equipment’, such as armoured vehicles and body armour, and provide 
‘assistance, advice and training’ to opposition forces in Syria ‘to help save 
lives’.95 The provision of such non-lethal assistance was described by Mr Hague 
as a ‘necessary, proportionate and lawful’ response to extreme human suffering 
and Iran’s increasing support for the Assad regime, although he did not offer any 
explanation as to how it constituted such a response.96 
In the context of Iran and Russia continuing to provide the Assad regime with 
arms,97 certain EU states, in particular the UK and France, pushed for either a 
further relaxation of the arms embargo or its cessation altogether so as to permit 
the unrestricted provision of arms to the opposition forces. William Hague 
continued to stress that providing the opposition forces with arms could not be 
                                                 
91  Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 [2011] OJ L 121/1, art 2(3). 
92  UK Government, Foreign Secretary Updates Parliament on Syria (10 January 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-updates-parliament-on-syria>;  ‘Hague: 
“Options Open” on Military Support for Syrian Rebels’, BBC News (online), 10 January 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20969386>. 
93  The Syrian National Coalition is a coalition of opposition groups in the Syrian Civil War, including the 
Free Syrian Army, that was founded in Doha, Qatar, in November 2012. 
94  Council Decision 2013/109/CFSP of 28 February 2013 Amending Decision 2012/739/CFSP Concerning 
Restrictive Measures against Syria [2013] OJ L 58/8, art 1. 
95  See United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 6 March 2013, vol 559, cols 963, 979 
(William Hague); ‘UK to Send Armoured Vehicles to Syrian Opposition’, BBC News (online), 6 March 
2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21684105>. 
96  ‘UK to Send Armoured Vehicles to Syrian Opposition’, above n 95. 
97   ‘Iran “Steps up Syria Support”, Hillary Clinton Warns’, BBC News (online), 1 February 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21289219>. 
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ruled out,98 while at the same time claiming that the UK was ‘determined that all 
[its] actions [would] uphold UK and international law, and support justice and 
accountability for the Syrian people themselves’ although, again, omitting to 
offer any explanation as to how such actions would fit within the international 
legal framework governing them.99 The UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, in 
more unembellished tones, stated in March 2013 that the UK may veto the EU 
arms embargo altogether – which was due for renewal at the end of May 2013 – 
if things deteriorated on the ground in Syria.100 In a less radical proposal, the UK 
subsequently circulated a draft document to EU diplomats in early May 2013 in 
which it suggested two options; either fully exempt the Syrian National Coalition 
from the arms embargo or remove the ‘non-lethal’ wording contained within it so 
as to permit lethal weapons to be supplied to them.101 This came not long after 
the commander of the Free Syrian Army had called for a lifting of the EU arms 
embargo altogether, claiming that it had a greater negative effect on the 
opposition than on the Assad regime.102 
EU members were divided over whether to lift the embargo, with some, such 
as Germany, concerned that this would lead to a proliferation of arms in Syria 
and the surrounding region.103 Nonetheless, on 27 May 2013 EU Foreign 
Ministers decided not to renew the embargo upon the supply of arms to the 
Syrian opposition forces.104 While there was an informal agreement at this time 
not to proceed with the delivery of arms, there was also no longer any EU 
obligations upon individual Member States to refrain from doing so. This lifting 
of the embargo to permit the provision of arms to the opposition forces thus 
renders this form of assistance lawful under EU law, along with that of a ‘non-
lethal’ nature. However, it nonetheless remains questionable whether such 
support from EU, or indeed non-EU, states is lawful under international law. In 
this respect, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, stated during a visit to 
London in March 2013 to meet with his UK counterpart, that ‘[i]nternational law 
doesn’t allow, doesn’t permit, the supplies of arms to non-governmental actors. 
It’s a violation of international law.’105 
                                                 
98  UK Government, above n 92; ‘Hague: Giving Arms to Syrian Rebels Cannot Be Ruled Out’, BBC News 
(online), 3 March 2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21647014>.  
99  UK Government, above n 92. 
100   ‘Syria: UK’s Cameron “May Veto EU Arms Embargo”’, BBC News (online), 12 March 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21763345>.  
101  ‘EU Arms Embargo on Syria: Scrap It or Drop “Non-lethal” Wording, Says UK’, RT (online), 9 May 
2013 <http://rt.com/news/uk-eu-arms-embargo-syria-027/>. 
102   ‘Free Syrian Army Chief: “We Need Arms and Aid”‘, BBC News (online), 6 March 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21681863>. 
103  ‘France and Germany Divided over Syrian Arms Embargo’, EurActiv.com (online), 12 March 2013 
<http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/france-germany-divided-syria-arm-news-518425>. 
104  ‘EU Arms Embargo on Syrian Opposition Not Extended’, The Guardian (online), 28 May 2013 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/27/eu-arms-embargo-syrian-opposition>. 
105  Luke Harding, ‘Russia Warns UK against Arming Syrian Rebels’, The Guardian (online), 14 March 2013 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/mar/13/russia-warns-uk-syrian-rebels>. 
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After claims had been made that the Assad regime had used Sarin nerve 
gas,106 French President François Hollande asserted on 5 June 2013 that proof of 
chemical weapons use in Syria ‘obliged the international community to act’ and 
that any action in response had to be ‘within the framework of international 
law’,107 although no explanation was proffered as to where the obligation to act 
came from, whether it was of a legal nature, and how such a response would fit 
within the legal framework governing such actions. While at the time of writing 
it is not clear whether, and if so which, Member States have delivered arms to the 
opposition forces in Syria,108 before addressing the possible unilateral legal 
justifications that might be relied upon to justify such action in Part IV of this 
article, it remains first to examine the position of non-EU states on the provision 
of arms and non-lethal assistance to the Syrian opposition forces. 
 
2   Non-EU States 
Upon the basis of the framework set out above in this article, the provision of 
arms by Iran and Russia to the Assad regime is not prima facie unlawful, while 
states are not permitted to provide arms and non-lethal military equipment to the 
opposition forces under the prohibitions of intervention and force.109 Non-EU 
states have generally attempted to stay within this framework and refrained from 
providing arms and non-lethal military equipment to the opposition forces, or at 
least openly claimed that they have. 
Nonetheless, some, and most notably the US, began providing aid of a 
financial nature, primarily due to the opposition groups in Syria making clear 
their frustration at the status quo.110 For example, the US Secretary of State, John 
Kerry, announced at the Friends of Syria Group in Rome in February 2013 that 
the US would provide $60 million of ‘non-lethal’ aid to support the Syrian 
National Coalition ‘in its operational needs, day to day’.111 However, there was 
no indication that this manifested itself in the form of military equipment or 
training, but instead appeared to be in the form of funds to aid the daily activities 
                                                 
106  ‘France’s Fabius “Confirms Sarin Use” by Syria Regime’, BBC News (online), 5 June 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22773268>. 
107  ‘Syrian Army Retakes Key Town of Qusair from Rebels’, BBC News (online), 5 June 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22778310>. 
108  Although there are reports that Croatia has been selling arms to the opposition forces in Syria from an 
undeclared surplus from the Balkan conflict in the 1990s: see ‘Who Is Supplying Weapons to the Warring 
Sides in Syria’, BBC News (online), 14 June 2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
22906965>. However, Croatia only became a member of the EU on 1 July 2013 thus meaning that the EU 
arms embargo, which came to an end on 31 May 2013, had not applied to it. 
109  That is, unless one takes the view that the provision of arms to any party in a civil war is unlawful. See 
below Part IV(C) for more on this argument. 
110  Jonathan Marcus, ‘Frustration Forces Western Shift on Syria’, BBC News (online), 28 February 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21621691>. 
111   John Kerry, ‘Remarks with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Terzi and Syrian Opposition Council 
Chairman Moaz al-Khatib’ (Speech delivered at Villa Madama, Rome, 28 February 2013) 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/02/205457.htm>; ‘Kerry Pledges $60m in “Non Lethal” 
Aid to Syrian Rebels’, BBC News (online), 28 February 2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-21612194>. 
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of the Syrian National Coalition as an opposition group. If this was the case, then 
under the conceptual framework set out above, it constitutes an unlawful 
intervention, although would not extend to an unlawful use of force.112 However, 
even if it could be condemned upon this basis as a violation of international law, 
it received very little in the way of such condemnation from other states. With 
the commander of the Free Syrian Army urging the international community to 
provide weapons and ammunition to fighters in the battle against the Assad 
regime,113 the US decided to go further in its support for the opposition forces. 
Yet, this was only to announce in April 2013 a doubling of aid to include non-
lethal military assistance and humanitarian aid,114 thereby nonetheless potentially 
engaging the prohibition of the use of force. 
In many ways tying his hands, President Obama had in 2012 described the 
use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime as a ‘red line’ that would change 
his administration’s ‘calculus’ in the region with the possibility for a greater level 
of intervention in Syria.115 While many states had claimed proof of the use of 
chemical weapons in Syria,116 the US simply claimed that there were ‘varying 
degrees of confidence’ that they had in fact been used,117 thereby being able to 
avoid committing to any firm action, including of a forcible nature. However, 
with such claims beginning to gain momentum, and with events on the ground in 
Syria continuing to deteriorate, Chuck Hagel, the US Secretary of Defense, stated 
on 2 May 2013 that arming the opposition forces was an option.118 Subsequently, 
on 14 June 2013, the US announced that in light of concluding that ‘small 
amounts’ of chemical weapons had been used by the Assad regime, it would 
provide military assistance to the Syrian opposition forces, although it did not 
specify what this would include, only that it would be ‘different in scope and 
                                                 
112  See above Part II(D). 
113 ‘Free Syrian Army Chief: “We Need Arms and Aid”’, above n 102. There have also been calls by the 
Free Syrian Army for recognition as the government to allow such a provision to occur: see below Part 
IV(B). 
114  ‘Secretary Kerry Announces Doubling of US Non-lethal Assistance to the Syrian Opposition and New 
Humanitarian Aid for the Syrian Crisis’ (Press Release, PRN 2013/0453, 20 April 2013) 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207810.htm>. 
115  James Ball, ‘Obama Issues Syria a “Red Line” Warning on Chemical Weapons’, The Washington Post 
(online), 21 August 2012 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-
red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-
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116  See, eg, ‘Chemical Weapons Used in Syria, Says Turkey’, France 24 (online), 11 May 2013 
<http://www.france24.com/en/20130511-chemical-weapons-syria-turkey>. In light of the presentation of 
this evidence some have accused President Obama of backtracking on his ‘red line’ stance: see ‘Obama 
Walks Back “Red Line” Stance on Syrian Government Using Chemical Weapons’, Fox News (online)¸30 
April 2013 <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/04/30/obama-walks-back-red-line-stance-on-syrian-
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117   ‘US Has “Some Confidence” Syria Used Chemical Weapons’, BBC News (online), 25 April 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22297569>. 
118  Thom Shanker and Mark Landler, ‘Hagel Confirms US Is Considering Arming Syria Rebels’, The New 
York Times (online), 2 May 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/world/middleeast/hagel-
confirms-us-is-considering-arming-syrian-rebels.html?_r=0>. 
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scale to what we have provided before.’119 While it was not clear when and by 
what means such arming and provision of military assistance would occur, there 
was speculation that the CIA would coordinate delivery of the military 
equipment and train the opposition forces in the use of it.120 Following this, on 22 
June 2013, the Foreign Ministers of the Friends of Syria Group, who were 
meeting in Qatar at the time, agreed to ‘provide urgently all the necessary 
materiel and equipment to the opposition on the ground, each country in its own 
way in order to enable them to counter brutal attacks by the regime and its 
allies.’121 
Despite a notable shift in attitude by both EU and non-EU states to the 
provision of non-lethal assistance and, most notably, arms, it transpired that some 
non-EU states had been providing arms to the opposition forces for some time. 
While this was most notably Qatar and Saudi Arabia,122 there were also reports 
that Libya, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon had provided arms, while Turkey had 
provided the route into Syria for such arms and the US had provided a 
coordinating role.123 While states have both covertly and overtly provided arms to 
the opposition forces, a notable absence has been any sort of justification, and in 
particular one of a legal nature, for such provision. This may, of course, simply 
be an implicit acknowledgement of the illegality of such action. On the other 
hand, it may indicate that these states feel that their actions are somehow 
inherently lawful thereby excluding the need to justify them. Either way, given 
that such action is taking place, whether there is the possibility under 
international law for unilaterally providing arms and/or non-lethal assistance to 
the opposition forces remains to be assessed in the next section. 
 
                                                 
119   ‘US Says It Will Give Military Aid to Syria Rebels’, BBC News (online), 14 June 2013 
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in Syria to the White House in the summer of 2012, this was not ultimately approved: Michael R Gordon, 
‘Backstage Glimpses of Clinton as Dogged Diplomat, Win or Lose’, The New York Times (online), 2 
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Syrian opposition forces: see Justin Vela, ‘Exclusive: Arab States Arm Rebels as UN Talks of Syrian 
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IV   EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE  
PROVISION OF ARMS AND ‘NON-LETHAL’ ASSISTANCE  
TO OPPOSITION GROUPS 
A   Authorisation by the UNSC 
Besides self-defence, the only established exception to the prohibition of the 
use of force is that of authorisation by the UNSC.124 As noted above, this 
authorisation equates to permission to use force and such force may be of either a 
direct or indirect nature.125 While there is nothing in principle to prevent the 
UNSC from expressly authorising states to specifically arm or supply non-lethal 
assistance to either government or opposition forces, this would nevertheless be 
an unusual thing for a resolution of this organ to include.126 Although in Libya 
states were authorised to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians and 
civilian-populated areas notwithstanding a previously imposed arms embargo, 
whether this actually incorporated the possibility of providing such aid to the 
opposition forces, as some argued that it did, was not ultimately clear.127 
However, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that a resolution of the UNSC 
may be more clearly directed towards the necessity of aiding a clearly identified 
group so that it would be able to hold its own in an armed conflict. While this is a 
theoretical possibility, given the relative deadlock that has been witnessed in the 
UNSC over the adoption of any resolution regarding the situation in Syria, this is 
certainly not a realistic possibility in the context of this particular conflict. 
 
B Government Recognition 
It was discussed above in Part II that states are permitted per se to provide 
arms and non-lethal assistance to the armed forces of the government of a state. 
The government may be of a de jure nature, in that it represents the constitutional 
governmental authority and/or democratically elected power. However, 
governmental power may also be determined on the basis of an entity exercising 
effective control over the territory and population of a particular state.128 
                                                 
124  See Niels Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to 
Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”’(2000) 11 European Journal of 
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(William H Taft). James Crawford has also noted, in reference to this arbitral decision, that ‘[i]n the case 
of governments, the “standard set by international law” is so far the standard of secure de facto control of 
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Nevertheless, in either situation, a government might be considered to be rather 
weak if it could not also engage in daily interactions and do business with other 
states. In this sense, the international legitimacy of a governmental regime is 
acquired through external recognition by other states.129 Thus, if the opposition 
forces within a state were to subsequently go on to exercise large scale effective 
control over the territory of the state and/or receive recognition as the 
government of the state concerned then it would arguably be lawful per se to 
provide them with arms and non-lethal forms of assistance. 
States do not today generally offer express recognition to governments, 
which is normally left to be implicitly determined upon the basis of their 
interaction with the regime concerned.130 However, there have been some 
conspicuous exceptions to this. For example, states were quick to provide – and 
then maintain – their recognition of the government of Alassane Ouattara in the 
aftermath of his success in elections in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 
even though it was Laurent Gbagbo who remained in effective control of the 
country for some time afterwards.131 Similarly, and in the immediate context of 
the Arab Spring, many states recognised the Libyan National Transitional 
Council (‘NTC’) as the government of Libya while the regime of Colonel 
Gaddafi continued to effectively control much of Libya, particularly territory in 
the west of the state.132 This latter recognition had various legal consequences, 
such as the release of assets held in various states to the opposition forces.133 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that recognition of the NTC as the government 
of Libya ‘when it did not have effective control of most of Libya was premature 
and therefore of dubious legality.’134 As such, it might also be argued that any 
provision of arms or non-lethal assistance to the NTC after this recognition had 
been provided may well have been unlawful. In the case of Libya, however, the 
supply of arms and training onto the territory of the state was prohibited, except 
perhaps in the context of the protection of civilians,135 meaning that even if the 
NTC was lawfully recognised as the government of Libya this did not have an 
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impact in and of itself upon the legality of the provision of arms and non-lethal 
assistance to it. 
It is thus of some significance that the Syrian National Coalition has been 
calling on states to recognise it as the ‘transitional government’, specifically so as 
to permit states to provide it with weapons in its struggle against the Assad 
regime. Indeed, the former head of the Coalition, Mouaz al-Khatib, stated that 
‘[w]hen we get political recognition, this will allow the coalition to act as a 
government and hence acquire weapons and this will solve our problems.’136 It is 
certainly true that in the absence of a general arms embargo upon the territory of 
Syria, the Syrian National Coalition’s recognition as the government may in 
principle have an impact upon the legality of the provision of arms to it. While, 
as with the NTC in Libya, recognition of the Syrian National Coalition as the 
government of Syria would at this stage be arguably premature, at least until the 
Coalition has gained effective control of all or most of the territory of Syria, such 
recognition would nonetheless appear to make the provision of arms and non-
lethal assistance lawful under international law. 
At the time of writing, however, states have thus far steered clear of 
recognising the Syrian National Coalition as the ‘government’ of Syria, but have 
instead restricted their recognition of the Coalition to ‘the “legitimate 
representatives” of the Syrian people.’137 It might be argued that, despite the 
recognising states refraining from using the word ‘government’ in their 
statements of recognition, governmental recognition was nonetheless their 
intention.138 However the intention of the recognising states seems to be 
generally clear in this instance. France, for example, appeared to choose its 
words carefully in not recognising the Syrian National Coalition as the 
government of Syria, but rather as ‘the future government of a democratic 
Syria’,139 thus perhaps providing some legitimacy to its claim of self-
determination,140 but nonetheless making any provision of arms and non-lethal 
assistance under such a level of recognition unlawful. Indeed, the French 
President, François Hollande, stated that France would not address the issue of 
providing arms ‘as long as it wasn’t clear where these weapons went’.141 ‘With 
the coalition’, the President continued to add, ‘as soon as it is a legitimate 
government of Syria, this question will be looked at by France, but also by all 
countries that recognise this government.’142 The US was also clear that it was 
not prepared to recognise the Syrian National Coalition as a ‘government-in-
exile’ but only, and in joining other states, as ‘the “legitimate representative” of 
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the Syrian people’.143 This lesser recognition thus appears to preclude 
government recognition as a legal basis upon which to justify the provision of 
weapons, training, and non-lethal military equipment to the opposition forces in 
Syria. 
 
C   Counter-intervention  
Where there is no UNSC arms embargo upon the territory of a state, of the 
type imposed in Libya, there is nothing in principle to legally preclude states 
from providing arms and non-lethal assistance to the governmental authorities 
concerned. Yet there is some support for the view that when a civil war is 
identifiable, that is, an internal armed struggle for power within a state the 
outcome of which is not certain, states are under a legal obligation to refrain from 
intervening in support of either side, whether the belligerent parties happen to be 
two non-governmental forces or the governmental forces of the state concerned 
and an opposition force. Those who adopt this view argue that in such a situation 
the citizens of each state should be allowed to determine their state’s political 
future independently and without outside interference. Indeed, intervention in 
support of one party would mean that the intervening state would be influencing 
the outcome of a conflict which is in the balance thereby preventing the state as a 
whole from determining its own future. There is support for this view from 
states,144 scholars,145 and the Institut de Droit International.146 In broadening this 
principle to contexts below that of the threshold of a civil war, Wright argues – in 
connection with assistance to a constitutional government to suppress a rebellion 
that is not externally supported – that international law 
does not permit the use of force in the territory of another state on invitation either 
of the recognized or the insurgent government in times of rebellion, insurrection 
or civil war. Since international law recognizes the right of revolution, it cannot 
permit other states to intervene to prevent it.147 
However, those that adopt this position of strict non-interference also accept 
that there is an exception to it in that ‘outside interference in favour of one party 
to the struggle permit[s] counter-intervention on behalf of the other.’148 On this 
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basis, given that the Assad regime would under this view arguably be being 
illegally provided with arms by both Iran and Russia due to the civil war that 
even President Assad himself has acknowledged is occurring,149 this would then 
provide the right to other states to arm and provide non-lethal assistance to the 
opposition forces, which in the absence of the prior support for the government 
forces would be an unlawful act. 
There are, however, identifiable problems with this position and, in general, 
in attaching a different set of rules to civil wars. First, there is a distinct lack of 
clarity over what constitutes a civil war for the purposes of applying these rules. 
An analogy could, of course, be made with the law of armed conflict so that a 
civil war is identifiable when control of a state’s territory is divided between two 
or more warring parties.150 Yet whether such an analogy is entirely appropriate is 
not altogether clear, and in any case, the level of division of control necessary for 
such a determination to be made is ultimately open to a large degree of 
subjectivity. Secondly, it is not in any case ‘at all clear that the view that 
international law (the jus ad bellum) treats interventions in civil war differently 
from any other situation has support in State practice.’151 Indeed, there does not 
seem to be much evidence that states accept that they are legally obliged to 
refrain from supporting governments in a civil war situation.152 Instead, in the 
civil war context, ‘[c]ontemporary international practice is replete with instances 
of detachments of armed forces sent by one State to another, at the latter’s 
request.’153 
To put this into context, while there have been concerns expressed regarding 
the probity of Russia and Iran in providing arms to the Assad regime, particularly 
given the brutality being inflicted through their use, there has been no, at least 
express, accusation that such provision is unlawful. If the UNSC was to impose 
an arms embargo upon the territory of Syria, as it did in Resolution 1970 in 
                                                 
149  Hamza Hendawi, ‘President Assad Acknowledges Struggle to Win Syria Civil War’, The Independent 
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Law 66, 67–9. 
152  See Akande, Would It Be Lawful for European (or Other) States, above n 134. Shaw notes that 
‘[p]ractice, however, does suggest that many forms of aid, such as economic, technical and arms 
provision arrangements, to existing governments faced with civil strife, are acceptable’:’ above n 15, 
1152. 
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Libya,154 such provision of arms to the government would be unlawful either 
within or outside a civil war. Yet, in the absence of such a UN-mandated 
embargo there does not seem to be any suggestion that the provision of weapons 
is unlawful per se. Affirming this was the former head of the Syrian National 
Coalition in requesting recognition as the government of Syria specifically so 
that they could be provided with arms.155 This request provides some 
contemporary support to the argument that the provision of weapons in a civil 
war is restricted to the forces of the government. 
Dinstein has, however, argued that there is at least one circumstance where 
the principle of non-assistance in a civil war might have to be maintained and 
that is where the state has plunged into ‘chaotic turbulence, with several 
claimants to constitutional legality or none at all’ as it may simply not be possible 
to identify ‘any remnants of the central Government and determining who has 
rebelled against whom.’156 On a practical point this is arguably correct, although 
does not seem to be applicable in the context of the Syria crisis. Outside such 
circumstances, there seems to be little opinio juris for a rule preventing the 
provision of arms to the governmental forces during a civil war or one permitting 
counter-intervention in support of the opposition forces in light of such prior 
intervention. 
 
D   Support for a ‘People’ Struggling for Self-determination 
The Syrian National Coalition has been recognised as either the, or at the 
very least a, legitimate representative of the Syrian people.157 A similar 
recognition was made regarding the NTC in Libya in 2011, prior to its 
recognition as the government of Libya.158 While, as discussed above,159 such 
recognition does not appear to be recognition of a governmental regime, it could 
be construed as recognition of the groups’ legitimate struggle for self-
determination.160 If this is the case, the question arises as to whether the groups 
are able to use force to achieve this aim under international law and most 
importantly for the purposes of this current article, whether third states are 
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156  Dinstein, above n 124, 120. 
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legally permitted to provide arms and ‘non-lethal’ assistance to them in the 
realisation of it. 
During the Cold War resolutions were adopted by the UNGA in which 
national liberation movements were recognised as having the right to ‘struggle’ 
for self-determination.161 While some have questioned whether the use of this 
ambiguous term included the use of force,162 there nonetheless appeared to be a 
consensus within the UNGA that ‘armed struggle’ by the self-determination 
movements was permitted.163 Furthermore, while the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations declares that 
‘[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives 
peoples … of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence’,164 
it further declares that ‘[i]n their actions against, and resistance to, … forcible 
action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples 
are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter.’165 In addition, the 1972 Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
‘[u]rges all states … to provide moral and material assistance to all peoples 
struggling for their freedom and independence’.166 To perhaps put this into some 
contemporary context, it might be argued that if the opposition forces in Syria are 
representative of a ‘people’ struggling for self-determination then they are clearly 
being forcibly deprived by the Assad regime of this right, with Russia and Iran 
also in violation of their obligations through their support for such measures. In 
this case the Syrian National Coalition may not only be able to forcibly resist it 
but are also able to seek and receive arms and non-lethal assistance in doing so. 
Yet, while recognition of the opposition groups in both Libya and Syria as 
‘legitimate representatives’ of the respective people might be viewed as 
recognition that they are engaged in a legitimate struggle for self-determination, 
the states that have provided such recognition were also not ‘explicit in saying 
that they [were] applying a self-determination framework.’167 Even if they had 
been, there is no objective definition of a ‘people’ for the purposes of this 
                                                 
161  See, eg, Definition of Aggression, GA Res 3314 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 29th sess, 2319th plen mtg, UN Doc 
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167  Akande, Would It Be Lawful for European (or Other) States, above n 134. 
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right.168 Furthermore, the elaboration of these rights and obligations were made 
during the decolonisation era of the 20th century, and as such, appear to be 
limited to national liberation movements battling against colonialism and 
occupation. While a revolution is clearly taking place in Syria, and one arguably 
took place in Libya, neither the Syrian National Coalition or NTC can be 
perceived as national liberation movements fighting battles to free their 
respective states from the grips of an external power. As such, while national 
liberation movements battling against colonialism and occupation had a right to 
‘armed struggle’ in pursuing their right of self-determination, it is questionable 
whether ‘peoples’ in other contexts who are in possession of a right of self-
determination similarly possess a right to engage in armed force to achieve it. 
There does not, it has to be said, appear to be any support for the proposition that 
they do. Indeed, ‘the extension of the right of self-determination outside the 
colonial context in the breakup of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia has 
not brought with it any state support for the use of force for this end’ either by 
the peoples themselves or by third states through either direct or indirect 
means.169 Consequently, there does not appear to be any ‘support for the right to 
use force to attain self-determination outside the context of decolonization or 
illegal occupation,’170 and as a result, it is doubtful whether arms and non-lethal 
assistance could be provided to the opposition forces upon the legal basis of 
supporting a self-determination movement. 
 
E   Indirect Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
The underlying rationale for the provision of arms and non-lethal assistance 
in the Arab Spring has ostensibly been to enable opposition forces to fight brutal 
regimes that are suppressing human rights. In Libya the question was whether 
such arms and assistance could be provided under the authority provided to 
‘protect civilians’,171 while in Syria the main justification advanced for the 
provision of non-lethal assistance was ‘to help save lives’,172 with the decision to 
commence providing arms appearing to be taken upon confirmation of evidence 
proving that chemical weapons have been used by the Assad regime.173 As such, 
one might expect that the provision of arms and assistance would be incorporated 
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under a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention if such a right can be said to 
exist under international law. 
The prohibition of the threat or use of force is found in article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter,174 with the only express exceptions to this prohibition being individual 
and collective self-defence and action undertaken by or with the express approval 
of the UNSC.175 While the UNSC has been involved in many forcible 
interventions with humanitarian aims as the underlying, if not, express 
motivation,176 there is no express right of unilateral, as opposed to multilateral, 
humanitarian intervention in the UN Charter. This consequently draws one into 
an examination as to whether an implied right to intervention based upon such 
grounds can be located within the UN Charter or whether one has developed 
either through a reinterpretation of the UN Charter or through customary 
international law. 
The stipulation in article 2(4) ‘expressly prohibits the threat or use of force 
‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ Some have 
thus argued for the legality of direct unilateral humanitarian intervention on the 
basis that such interventions do not in principle permanently infringe upon the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the target state and, far from 
being ‘inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’, would in fact be 
consistent with such purposes given that these are undertaken in furtherance of 
the protection of human rights.177 Indeed, the Preamble of the UN Charter is 
clear that one of the founding purposes of the UN is ‘to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights’. Upon this basis, the door is opened to arguments 
along similar lines for indirect humanitarian intervention, in the form of the 
provision of arms and non-lethal assistance. Yet the travaux préparatoires of this 
particular provision of the UN Charter indicates that, far from providing 
exceptions to the general scope of the prohibition, the particular wording 
included was done so as to provide particular emphasis to these facets of a 
state.178 
In addition, while a few commentators have argued that such a right exists 
under international law, or that such a right should exist, state acceptance of such 
a right is ambiguous at best, and certainly does not exhibit the practice and opinio 
juris necessary to modify the prohibition of the use of force in the incorporation 
of one. There were no incidences during the Cold War where states resorted to 
forcible action by invoking a legal right of humanitarian intervention, or even 
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justifying their actions upon humanitarian grounds. Instead, those interventions 
which arguably had a positive humanitarian outcome, in particular India’s 
intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 
1978–9, and Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 1979, were justified on other 
legal bases, most notably self-defence.179 This state of affairs arguably led to the 
UK claiming in 1986 that ‘the overwhelming majority of contemporary legal 
opinion comes down against the existence of a right of humanitarian 
intervention.’180 Indeed, this was for the reasons, as noted above, that neither the UN 
Charter nor international law more generally seem to specifically incorporate such a 
right and that ‘state practice in the past two centuries, and especially since 1945, at 
best provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian intervention, and, on 
most assessments, none at all.’181 Ultimately, and upon the basis of the available 
evidence, the UK was of the opinion that ‘the best case that can be made in support 
of humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal.’182 
Yet not only did the UK fail to find support for such a right, but it appeared also to 
argue against the possible development of one. Indeed, it claimed that 
on prudential grounds … the scope for abusing such a right argues strongly 
against its creation. … the case against making humanitarian intervention an 
exception to the principle of non-intervention is that its doubtful benefits would be 
heavily outweighed by its costs in terms of respect for international law.183 
It is thus somewhat ironic that today, in the post-Cold War era, the UK has been 
perhaps the leading proponent amongst states for such a right. Indeed, in the two 
leading examples of interventions that appeared to have a humanitarian purpose 
during this time – that is, the establishment of the safe havens and no-fly zones in 
Iraq in 1991–2 and their subsequent enforcement along with the intervention by 
NATO in Kosovo in 1999 – only the UK (alongside Belgium in the aftermath of the 
latter intervention) justified its actions under a right of humanitarian intervention, 
and even then, it has to be said, somewhat equivocally.184 
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In addition, ‘the so-called “right” of humanitarian intervention’ was stated as 
having ‘no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general principles 
of international law’ in the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention by the Group of 
77 coalition of developing states.185 This was a significant rejection given that 
this group represents the views of 132 states of the international community. 
Furthermore, the ICJ in the Nicaragua case of 1986 was also somewhat 
dismissive in its jurisprudence by claiming that ‘the use of force could not be the 
appropriate method to monitor or ensure [respect for human rights].’186 While 
this case is nearly thirty years old, the ICJ has not stated any more support for 
such a right or indicated that circumstances have necessitated a change in 
approach. 
Perhaps the final nail in the coffin of a right of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention has emerged through the R2P concept which was advanced as the 
possible solution to the dilemma thrown up through the unilateral intervention 
witnessed in Kosovo in 1999.187 While only seen as an ‘emerging norm’ at 
best,188 the ‘responsibility to react’ element of this responsibility has not been 
placed in the hands of states, but has instead been very much placed with the 
UNSC.189 Although the debate continues as to what should happen if the Council 
finds itself unable to act in the face of a humanitarian crisis,190 as is currently the 
case in Syria, and in particular, who is to shoulder this responsibility should the 
Council fails to act,191 the possibility of states acting unilaterally has not been put 
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forward as an acceptable possibility.192 Indeed, although the UNSC arguably 
acted under R2P in authorising the use of force in Libya,193 the fact that it has not 
taken similar action under R2P in Syria has not expressly provoked any real calls 
for unilateral action in its place.194 Thus any supply of arms or non-lethal 
assistance justified upon a right of humanitarian intervention or R2P would not 
appear to have any contemporary legal basis. 
 
F   The Theory of Legitimate Defence 
There is a final possibility which should perhaps be considered in the context 
of the provision of arms and non-lethal assistance to opposition groups, 
particularly given its connection with self-defence as the sole unilateral exception 
to the prohibition of use of force. Indeed, the ‘theory of legitimate defence’ 
provides that states can act in defence of individuals in another state, and as such, 
may have some bearing on the way in which we perceive the possibilities for 
states to invoke self-defence in this context.195 
The theory first establishes that the legal concept of ‘self-defence’ as used in 
domestic common law systems is necessarily supplemented by other provisions 
so as to provide for the defence of other persons while the concept of ‘legitimate 
defence’ in civil law systems is not; such defensive actions are already 
encompassed in the relevant provisions. These differences are then transposed 
into the international arena as the English version of article 51 of the UN Charter 
governing the right of self-defence utilises the concept of ‘the inherent right of 
self-defence’ while the French version employs the concept of a ‘droit naturel de 
légitime défense’. This semantic difference leads the authors of the theory to 
conclude that the substantive differences between the domestic systems regarding 
the scope of the right must also exist in the different versions of article 51 so that 
the French version of article 51 provides for the concept of the defence of others. 
‘The concept’, the authors argue, ‘supports a much broader range of permissible 
interventions, not just limited to individual self-defense or mutual defense 
arrangements. Any nation has the right to intervene when nations fall victim to 
illegal aggression.’196 Indeed, groups of people, or more specifically ‘nations’, 
have a right of self-defence under article 51 and ‘[b]ecause nations have a natural 
right to self-defense in the face of an armed attack, it follows that others have a 
right to come to their defense as well.’197 The authors are keen to point out that 
this is not the same as collective self-defence, which firmly exists in the interstate 
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tradition of international law. Instead, the theory of legitimate defence provides 
for the defence of individuals or nations that exist within other states. 
In many respects, the theory certainly adds to the debate as to the ways in 
which states may be able to provide arms and non-lethal assistance to opposition 
groups. Furthermore, it is one that keeps the debate within the terms of the UN 
Charter.198 However, there are notable problems with this theory in the context of 
the discussion in this article. For example, the authors argue that under the right, 
the world community can come to the aid of any nation who has a legitimate claim 
to self-defense against an armed attack. … When a nation is not in control of its 
own affairs but is part of a larger state and it suffers an attack against its own 
interests, either from its own government or from outside forces, it has an inherent 
right of self-defense. And the world community has the right to intervene on its 
behalf through the exercise of legitimate defense.199 
However, the authors seem to be oblivious to the fact that the right of self-
defence only arises in the context of the occurrence of an ‘armed attack’ or 
‘aggression armée’ against ‘a Member of the United Nations.’200 If a state was to 
provide arms or non-lethal assistance to a ‘nation’ it would not be intervening in 
defence of a ‘member of the UN’, a phrase which is firmly placed within the 
statist conception of international law. Instead, it would be intervening directly 
against the wishes of such a member in support of individuals based within the 
state’s territorial confines. The proposition that an armed attack can be inflicted 
by a state upon its own people thus providing states with a right of defence of 
others is a very controversial one, and probably for this reason, not one that has 
been fully considered, or indeed, accepted as law. 
Questions might also be posed in regard to when a state might take it upon 
itself to intervene in support of an opposition group under this theory. In this 
respect, the authors of the theory deny that the group needs to either declare itself 
the victim of an armed attack or request assistance, two formalities that are 
attached to the right of collective self-defence.201 Indeed, the authors argue that 
the reason to relax the requirement of a formal request for assistance is that the 
responding state is engaging in defense of others, not some contorted version of 
self-defense. Just as anyone on the street has the right to come to the defense of a 
victim of a violent attack and need not wait for a formal request, so too any 
member of the world community should have the right to engage in defense of 
others when a violent attack has occurred.202 
In this sense it is argued that ‘the whole point of defense of others is that 
strangers who happen upon the scene can do something about it.’203 However, 
                                                 
198  This is important that, as the authors argue, arguments promoting rights outside of the bounds of the UN 
Charter ‘weaken the international prohibition on the use of force, which is the centerpiece of the 
international legal order’: ibid 134. 
199  Ibid 146–7.  
200  UN Charter art 51. 
201  Fletcher and Ohlin, above n 195, 70. The ICJ stated these requirements in the Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 
14, 120–1 [232]–[234]. 
202  Fletcher and Ohlin, above n 195, 70. 
203  Ibid 80 (emphasis in original). 
678 UNSW Law Journal Volume 36(2) 
this apparent analogy with the domestic context simply does not work in the 
international framework. Not only would it run deep against the principles of 
non-intervention and non-use of force, but the possibilities for abuse where states 
are able to make such subjective and unilateral decisions are endless. Ultimately, 
given that no state has relied upon legitimate defence in any context, let alone in 
providing arms or non-lethal assistance to an opposition force, it is difficult to 
contend that this is anyhow a ‘right’, even to be labelled as a controversial one, 
under international law and thus one upon which the provision of arms and non-
lethal assistance to an opposition force could be firmly based. 
 
V   CONCLUSION 
While the supply of arms and non-lethal assistance was a stable feature of the 
Cold War, what distinguishes the incidents witnessed in the Arab Spring – and 
particularly in Syria – with this period was the open righteousness with which 
many states declared their actual or potential provision. Despite concerns 
regarding the identity and underlying aims of those on the receiving end, as well 
as the short- and long-term negative implications of such provision,204 the 
righteousness was largely based upon arguments of morality (in terms of saving 
lives) and strategy (in terms of bringing to an end the regime of Gaddafi in Libya 
and persuading the Assad regime in Syria to come to the negotiating table). But 
the same states also paid lip service to the necessity of their actions falling within 
the legal ‘framework’. While in Libya action was justified under the UNSC 
authorisation provided, in Syria there has been a distinct lack of specificity in this 
respect. This leaves to the imagination exactly how such action can be justified 
within a framework which, as set out in Parts II and IV above, gives a 
diametrically opposed answer to the question of the legality of supplying arms 
and non-lethal assistance to opposition forces both within and outside the civil 
war context. 
                                                 
204  The identity of the opposition forces and who they ultimately represent and place allegiance to has been 
the main expressed concern of states in the Arab Spring. In the case of Libya, it was openly 
acknowledged that the acting coalition of states did not know who the rebel groups were, with some 
suggestions of possible links to al-Qaeda: see Praveen Swami, Nick Squires and Duncan Gardham, 
‘Libyan Rebel Commander Admits His Fighters Have Al-Qaeda Links’, The Telegraph (online), 25 
March 2011 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8407047/Libyan-
rebel-commander-admits-his-fighters-have-al-Qaeda-links.html>. In Syria, the al-Nusra Front has openly 
expressed its allegiance to the leader of al-Qaeda: see ‘Syria Crisis: Al-Nusra Pledges Allegiance to Al-
Qaeda’, BBC News (online), 10 April 2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22095099>. 
Furthermore, if the West was to arm the opposition forces in Syria, then it is possible that both Russia and 
Iran would consequently increase their own supply of arms to the Assad regime. This would lead to a 
proliferation of arms not only on the streets of Syria, but also potentially in the region more widely with 
the possible intervention of other states. Israel, for one, has openly said that it would not find such a 
situation acceptable: see Richard Spencer, ‘Israeli Threat to Intervene in Syria’, The Telegraph (online), 
18 April 2013 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10004275/Israeli-threat-to-
intervene-in-Syria.html>. 
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Yet, alongside this vague reference to the international legal framework there 
has, in addition, been a distinct lack of general reaction – equating, perhaps, to 
acquiescence – regarding the legality of such action in Syria, with Russia 
appearing rather alone in expressly claiming its illegality. Indeed, China, who is 
often aligned with Russia on such issues, has remained remarkably silent. 
Similarly, there has been no discernible reaction from the Non-Aligned 
Movement.205 The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic has urged caution and for a de-escalation in the 
militarisation of the conflict.206 This sentiment has been shared by the UN 
Secretary-General who restricted his condemnation to claiming that the arming of 
the Syrian rebels ‘would not be helpful’.207 In addition to not sanctioning the 
action, the UNSC has also unsurprisingly not condemned it, while the UNGA has 
not passed judgment, except for calling for a political transition.208 Although a 
lack of reaction might be expected when action of a forcible nature is merely 
being debated, this might be expected to change upon a firm decision to proceed, 
for example with the decision of the US to provide arms and the statement of the 
Friends of Syria Group in June 2013. But these decisions and statements did not 
seem to generate any further, or more discernible, reaction, and certainly none 
that might indicate that a jus cogens norm was at stake. 
The framework in Part II of this article suggested a difference in perception 
in legality, if not legal consequences, between unlawful interventions and 
unlawful uses of force. Yet, the real difference appears from the Syria crisis to be 
between direct and indirect unilateral uses of force. This, it is suggested here, is 
something which arguably stems from the introduction and evolution of the R2P 
concept.209 Indeed, the last unilateral humanitarian intervention of a direct 
forcible nature – NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 – was heavily debated 
and commented upon, and did not pass without accusations of illegality from 
states, including Russia, China, India, Cuba, Ukraine and Belarus,210 the Group 
of 77,211 the UN Secretary-General,212 and the Independent International 
                                                 
205  The Final Document of the 16th Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned 
Movement held in Tehran, Iran, in August 2012 contained very little mention of the Syrian crisis. It did 
state, however, that ‘[t]he Heads of State or Government took note of the efforts of the international 
community to deal with the situation in Syria’: Islamic Republic of Iran, ‘16th Summit of the Heads of 
State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement – Final Document’ (Working Paper, Non-Aligned 
Movement, 31 August 2012) 100 [364] (emphasis altered). 
206   ‘Syria Conflict Has Reached New Levels of Brutality – UN’, BBC News (online), 4 June 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22765692>. 
207  Haroon Siddique and Tom McCarthy, ‘UN Secretary General Says US Arming Syria Rebels “Would Not 
Be Helpful” – As It Happened’, The Guardian (online), 15 June 2013 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
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208  The Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, GA Res 67/262, UN GAOR, 67th sess, 80th plen mtg, Agenda 
Item 33, UN Doc A/RES/67/262 (4 June 2013). 
209  See above Part IV(E). 
210  These states tabled a draft UNSC resolution which affirmed that the unilateral use of force by NATO 
constituted, amongst other things, a violation of art 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
211  See Declaration of the South Summit, UN Doc A/55/74. 
212  See Gray, above n 3, 41. 
680 UNSW Law Journal Volume 36(2) 
Commission on Kosovo, who concluded that the campaign was ‘illegal but 
legitimate’.213 In fact, very few of the acting states made reference to any 
framework of international law, let alone openly argued for the legality of the 
action.214 Ultimately, there was a distinct sense from all concerned that the action 
was unlawful, although many perceived it nonetheless as possessing a degree of 
legitimacy. Despite the subsequent emergence of the R2P concept and its quest to 
reconcile legality with legitimacy in the launching of humanitarian action, the 
result of 12 years of evolution of the concept is that direct forcible humanitarian 
interventions remain lawful only if undertaken by or with the express consent of 
the UNSC.215 Indeed, Libya can perhaps be seen as providing some practical 
support for this contention in that unilateral action was ruled out by Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, NATO Secretary-General, in the absence of a UNSC mandate.216 
Yet, while the emergence and development of the R2P concept has thus far 
not changed the law, it has nonetheless appeared to have changed perceptions. In 
the context of direct forcible action, while there was previously an acceptance 
that the UNSC could lawfully intervene in civil strife where lives are at stake, the 
emergence of R2P has led to there being something of an expectation that it 
should.217 However, the contrast in reaction by the UNSC to the Libyan and 
Syrian conflicts starkly highlights that, despite the law remaining as it was, the 
UNSC also remains a relatively unreliable and inconsistent body regardless of 
the arrival of R2P. 
It is in this respect that the Syrian conflict may provide some tentative 
support for the proposition that perceptions are beginning to shift, or at least 
crystallise, in connection with the acceptability of unilateral indirect forcible 
actions in the R2P context, in which the conflict in Syria can be seen to be 
positioned.218 Indeed, while direct unilateral forcible intervention was expressly 
excluded in both Libya and Syria, even by many of the potential acting states,219 
                                                 
213  See generally the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
214  See Christian Henderson, ‘The Centrality of the United Nations Security Council in the Legal Regime 
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2013) 120, 149. 
215  See above Part IV(E). 
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Caution’, The Guardian (online), 2 March 2011 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/01/libya-
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217  See Michael Wood, ‘The Law on the Use of Force: Current Challenges’ (2007) 11 Singapore Year Book 
of International Law 1, 13. 
218  Eg, in response to the heavy fighting that was witnessed in the town of Qusayr in June 2013, the UNSC 
stated that ‘[t]he members of the Security Council call upon all parties in Syria to do their utmost to 
protect civilians and avoid civilian casualties, recalling the primary responsibility of the Syrian 
Government in this regard’: see Department of Public Information, United Nations, ‘Security Council 
Press Statement on Heavy Fighting in Al-Qusayr, Syria’ (Press Release, SC/11028, 7 June 2013) 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11028.doc.htm>. 
219  Although the US has ominously stationed F-16 fighter jets and Patriot missiles in Jordan: see ‘US to Keep 
Patriot Missiles and F-16s in Jordan’, BBC News (online), 15 June 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22924078>. 
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indirect forcible intervention, of a controversial nature in Libya and formally 
unlawful in Syria, has seemingly not been. The emboldened way in which the 
proponent states appeared to have asserted the legitimacy of such action in this 
context, even if the specific legal basis was not alluded to, is arguably explained 
by the shift in perception of acceptable action in light of the emergence of the 
R2P concept, albeit without a formal legal basis to support it. Indeed, this was 
certainly not witnessed in the same way during the Cold War, and it is difficult to 
envisage it being displayed in the context of the provision of arms to an 
opposition force in a state where the state authorities are protecting those within 
its borders. 
While debates regarding the possibilities for action outside of the UNSC in 
the R2P context have been somewhat dominated by the issue of direct forcible 
action, given the cul-de-sac that these have thus far led to, it might be said that 
the time is ripe for discussions regarding the possibilities for indirect forcible 
action. Yet, if one lesson has been learnt over the past decade since the 
emergence of R2P, it is that abstract attempts to ignite some consensus on the 
issue of action do not yield any concrete and practical solutions. Indeed, perhaps 
highlighting this fact, and in the only joint pronouncement of states as a whole on 
R2P, in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document even UNSC action was to 
be determined on a ‘case by case’ basis.220 This seemingly ruled out a principled 
basis for action under the umbrella of R2P and provided evidence that states 
simply did not wish to either obligate or restrict themselves in regards to the 
possibility of taking action in future crises. Similarly, while some states were 
clearly frustrated by the Arms Trade Treaty’s omission to include anything on the 
supply of arms to non-state actors, this omission was arguably indicative of the 
fact not that such action was either clearly lawful or unlawful, but that it was an 
issue that states did not want to prospectively bind themselves on. 
For the same reason, it is unlikely that any clarification upon the legality of 
the provision of arms and non-lethal assistance in the R2P context will emerge in 
the form of a grand UNGA declaration, of the type witnessed upon several 
occasions during the Cold War. Instead, it is more likely that if the position is to 
be clarified further, this will be the result of agreement amongst states discernible 
from subsequent practice. Indeed, general statements of principle aside, if what 
has been witnessed in the Syrian crisis really does signify a clarification in the 
perception of acceptable behaviour in light of the emergence of R2P, and similar 
action and reactions are witnessed again, then this may well provide the evidence 
to discern a shift, or at least a carved exception, from the established legal 
framework governing the provision of arms and non-lethal assistance. Whether 
this is a positive step for international peace and security is debatable, but it 
would undoubtedly be a significant step forward in the evolution of the R2P 
concept. 
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